Category Archives: Epistemology

Responsibility and the Hero’s Trial

Matthew Polly is kind enough to leave a note on this post. He is the author of American Shaolin.

I’ve always been a fan of the literature of the hero’s journey and Mr. Polly’s book falls into this category. But it reminds me of a conversation I had a few weeks back with my fiction students about the core issue of fire, a metaphor for the hero’s trial: Matthew Polly against himself; Sir Gawain and himself and the Green Knight.

Most of the students agreed that a college education can–and I emphasize the “can”–serve as one step on a trial. So this could be added to my last post about the ethics list:

1. Students should seek out trials. (As should faculty)

Thanks, Matt.

Technology and Context

Alec Couros leaves me a nice note and asserts this:

We must help students to understand what is worth reading, how to find the relevant voices in the huge raving river of information, and then be able to engage in conversations with what they have learned, and who they have learned from.

I agree that a great deal of critical power is important to solving infoglut. Software like Feeddemon helps.

But I would suggest that the habit of change and critical powers are relational in a new media world.

Specifically, let’s take Shakespeare on as an example. Online search tools provide effective drills into Macbeth. Additional software such as Diigo and Tinderbox provide analytical tools, as would a pencil and notebook.

The new media thinker must, however, be aware of the tool. Both Macbeth and the tools used in engagement must be evaluated deeply, just as I must evaluate a router in carpentry work. A router is, conceptually, an opportunity to create.

My goal is always this: to teach people in a particular course to teach themselves (and to beat me at my own game).

Surfaces

I don’t know much about this but it would seem that bounded space perceived as infinite on a cross section ( the top of a table) could be figured as having points that are all even numbered and positive. Right? That is, every instant you cut in half would turn out to be 2, 4, 6 et cetera without the need for a five, which gums things up. What sort of a fiction would develop from this, anyway? What sort of poem? Is such an infinity likely? Or would this negate parabolas and velocity?

As I’m behind in my reading (whatever that means), I’ve started No Counry for Old Men and just refinished No One Writes to the Colonel (Thanks, Carmen). But I keep coming back to the mysterious world of milled wood and am worrying over why Joe Lieberman persists in making a fool of himself.

Extrusions also bother, much like the issue of infinity. A corner is an extrusion. All edges extrude. But what does that mean?

Story and Carpentry

Okay, so it’s damned hot, even now at about 9 on a Monday. Yet it’s been a little cool here at the weblog. The kitchen remodel has, of course, expanded to include the removal of two floors underneath the existing laminate, and some rethinking because of hidden pipes in the wall where I was going to add a stud and a 32 inch wall cabinet. The vent pipe from the basement curls out from the wall about five inches from the ceiling and was hidden by the old span of cabinets. But that’s the way things go with a house you didn’t build yourself. In addition, the old cabinets had to be removed with a reciprocating saw because they had been tightly framed around and attached to adjoining wallboard and studding from the other side of the wall. I have to carefully refit those cabinets in the garage. Anyway, drawers have been built, doors, and everything’s mostly square. The doityourselfer job I’ve clocked at about 70 dollars a cabinet (6 cabs in all plus a red oak floor and a new wall) minus the extra dollars for installation by a pro.

In addition to this, the kids are doing a bangup job on their digital stories, catching on quickly to the software’s keyframe concept and timeline, but the more important concept of the storyboard, I find, is the critical concept: having an idea of an entire project from its parts and the hands-on control of paper, pencil, and sequence. Again, back to planning, preparation, and simple sketches (pedagogically and logically, this is where the good stuff works itself out). People love to dig into the cool tools, but it’s the simple expression of visual planning that will make the timeline easier to deal with. Lots of server space for video is helpful too. We’re working with smart and creative highschoolers and liking it a lot.

God and Integers

This post comes follows from these steps. My good friend Jean-Marc proposed this Cartesian enclosure:

Mathematics is the only sure path that leads to heaven. Remember that God created the integers and everything else is the work of man.

Note that I take this in the psirit of fun in which it was offered and pretend no expertise. Here’s my response

Can one prove the existence of integers? Let’s take the positive integer 2. Two what?

Here’s Jean-Marc’s response

The question of existence or inexistence of integers (or mathematical objects in general) is purely philosophical. Hence, it is hard to debate. Nonetheless, you must recall the 3 main dogmas that are at the core of the Foundations of Mathematics: Platonism, formalisms, and constructivism.

The Platonist holds that mathematical objects are real, immutable, and independent of the human mind. So, according to those folks, mathematics is already out there waiting to be discovered. The formalist, in contrast, claims that mathematics is a compilation of definitions, axioms, and theorems that are not about anything real. The constructivist’s view is quite different from the previous two as he views mathematics as a collection of ideas that can be obtained via finite constructions. So, the Cantor Set (that you and I talked about recently) would be seen as useless and a complete waste of time by the constructivist.

I hope this answers your questions on existence or inexistence of mathematical objects. With respect to your comment “Let’s take the positive integer 2. Two what?” I am not sure I know what you mean here. Are you talking about the numeral 2 or the number 2? Either way, your answer is in the preceding paragraph.

I want to end this email on a note of curiosity. How do String and Quantum disprove Leopold Kronecker’s view that “God created the integers”? My curiosity will only be satisfied if your response is not philosophical. I would want to see an argument that is deductive in nature.

Unfortunately, the original question was philosophical re: Kronecker, who perhaps should not have ascribed integers to God, unless he could prove that tensor theory was also a divine creation. My response is, I believe, non-philosophical and asks for some demonstration of God’s hand in the creation of integers as a matter of play. Troubling scientific waters, I would claim.

Therefore, the question “2 what?” asserts that it’s the oranges that are real not their relation to one another and asserts further that integers can only be the work of man.

As to the platonist, formalist, constructivist triplet, consider the Kronecker Delta. Do we know what “idea” the symbol refers to? We know the formalism. And can build build 3index objects. Isn’t it the elements that matter?

Afterlife

Susan Gibb asks about how much depends on belief in an afterlife. It is an important question. But I don’t know if it changes the logic Philosophy proposes to Boethius concerning Fortune.

Metacognition and Storytelling

A workshop on metacognition run by our own Marguerite Yawin ended with a wonderful conclusion: the backbone of thinking about process and problem solving is storytelling. If you want to figure out how you got from point a to point b, you are essentially putting together the cognitive narrative: telling the story. Showing the work in math bears this mark as does a portfolio or any other sort iterative sorting.

In our outcomes assessment work, Francena Dwyer says we have to start “writing the paper”: putting it all together will reveal a story and perhaps other things.

(most people don’t know that I have an odd interest in shaving technology commercials and so I just learn about the Gillet Fussion, an implement with 5 blades. Why don’t they just put ten blades in the wacky thing and be done with it)

Moretti at The Valve: Space, Maps, and Reading

The discussion is in full swing over at The Valve concerning Franco Moretti’s book Graphs, Maps, and Trees for those interested. One particular quote strikes me from one of the author’s responses

Close reading and abstract models, or, interpretation and explanation. Bill Benzon is absolutely right in saying that even in the sciences research is not evenly spread, but clusters around specific issues – the fruit fly is a particularly neat example, because detective fiction is a sort of literary fruit fly (with few and clear variables, easy to manipulate). But this is not close reading, it’s actually much more similar to the “experiments” (on village stories etc.) that I try to do in the book. So, I still think that the strategies I outlined are antithetical to the mainstream of literary criticism. It may be tactically silly for me to say so now, given that the general consensus is that what I do could be interesting, as long as it doesn’t want to get rid of current procedures, but what can I do, this is not a matter of bragging, or of originality (originality, in a book that borrows all its models?!), or of democracy (a hundred flowers, yes, and more) – it’s a matter of logic. Between interpretation (that tends to make a close reading of a single text) and explanation (that works with abstract models on a large groups of texts) I see an antithesis. Not just difference, but an either/or choice.

The discussion is unfolding as a “what to do” variety that often comes up as a basic question in literary studies. Method takes a huge amount of time here and it should, I think. When someone proposes a new look at an old thing, method’s surface (yuk) takes on new textures. Eric Hayot’s post prior to Moretti’s has extentions to this.

Why, then, is Moretti’s work controversial? Partly because what he is doing is new and interesting, and partly because it comes at a moment when the last major wave of new ideas seems to have foundered. Many people seem to want a new Theory to replace the exhausted old Theory. These people need to relax. Moretti is like a guy who shows up to the party with liquor right after the keg has been emptied. Part of why he is welcome is because he is saving some people from boredom or despair (he writes: “it is precisely in the name of theoretical knowledge that ‘Theory’ should be forgotten, and replaced with the extraordinary array of conceptual constructions—theories, plural, and with a lower case ‘t’—developed by the natural and the social sciences”). People who are desperate to cling to the old keg—either because they have grown to love it, or because they think there’s still beer in there—sometimes feel threatened by the new guy at the party, and want to say that he shouldn’t be at the party at all. But surely there’s room for the beer drinkers and the liquor drinkers in the room; let a hundred flowers bloom. In this I am more catholic than Moretti himself, who in the lines I cite above seems to want everyone to move away from the keg and get to the good stuff they’re drinking over at the science fraternities.

From another perspective what Moretti is doing is not that new at all. Louis Menand points out in his Professions 2005 essay is that literary studies has always transformed itself by borrowing wholesale from other disciplinary structures. “Theory” as a branch (so thick it became a root) of literary studies produced its momentum out of encounters with linguistics (Saussure, Jakobson), anthropology (Lévi-Strauss), sociology (the Frankfurt School, Bourdieu), psychology (Freud, Lacan), history (Canguilhem, Foucault) and philosophy (Derrida, Levinas, Nancy, Lyotard, not to mention Marx, Hegel, and so on). The “real” linguists, anthropologists, sociologists and philosophers go on to decry literary studies’ adulteration of their ideas; rinse and repeat. In this sense the newness of Moretti is just the kind of newness we in literary studies have always wanted. I would not be surprised if this newness operates on 25-year, generational cycles (though in the academic humanities you might have to account for the distortions produced by the nine years it takes, on average, to get a Ph.D).

and this on the concept of interpretation

For Moretti, on the other hand, “interpretation” suggests a kind of belles-lettristic focus on the text at the expense of the “larger structures” and “temporal cycles” within which the form as the subject of a materialist history operates. Interpretation does not arrive at the “first” place of the text because it fetishizes local meaning at the expense of historical materialism. Though Moretti believes that no “single explanatory framework may account for the many levels of literary production and their multiple links with the larger social system,” what he’s interested in are “production” and “social systems,” not interpretations which are themselves presumably only expressions of those systems or attempts to ignore them.

My theory of the historically negative force of “interpretation” in January 2006 will, it seems, have to account for the fact that “interpretation” means different things to different people who could nonetheless, through a distant enough reading, be seen to be arguing against the same thing. Does this “close” (not that close, frankly) reading of “interpretation” suggest that a more “distant” historical analysis of its appearance has lost all claim to the truth? No, because it still matters, I think, that the word “interpretation” is used in both cases. But I am suggesting that such a distant reading without an accompanying close reading will be missing out on at least some of the truth, just as a myopic focus on the difference between these uses of interpretation will fail to grasp the broader historical context within which they function. There is no room for “first” or “second” place in such a scheme. Rather there is an accommodating sense that no one method has all the answers, one that should produce a corresponding modesty about interpretive claims.

Seems to me that discipline areas have always needed a kick in the ass, which is something we’ve been talking a lot about around here. But I think that the more important discussion will come with a question of the suitability of questions that open disciplines to others. What one can learn from Keats is certainly a different question than what one can learn from the gravitron. But this has to do with THE QUESTION. This will be a persistent problem. Nothing’s really grabbing my eye in the discussion yet but for the few mentions of maps/cognitive maps.

I don’t know if literary theory has failed? At what could it have failed? Even as a student no one could say what the program was. But I still think that metaphors for sight and a spatial awareness is important to a future of literary knowing and experience. For nora to work, there must be some determination of a radius. Amardeep Singh’s essay on texture and Bill Benson’s comment have something to do with determining a sense of “what to do with” what we can see and seek out and perhaps build.

Process

Good carpenters know that before the saw hits the wood, the graphite has to hit (not good metaphor, says me) the grid paper. I’m building cabinets to fill in a space in the kitchen and drew the items to size, measured all the cuts, and have laid the cuts out onto virtual sheets. Do-it-yourself carpenters know that you can build a nice cabinet for $70 dollars or less and save 25 % off store quality and more if you’re into custom.

These, of course, are Plato’s cabinets. Cabinets that live in the realm of ideas. When they’re formed or during the actual building when you cut inside the mark that’s when you realize the imperfection of sight and hand and mind. Making things is scary. Buying from the shop is always easier. I now realize that this post is not about cabinets.

By the way, the congress people are making fools of themselves. Nothing like a good supreme court nominee proceeding to make this happen.

(Not good mixing posts, says me).

Time continued

While about today, I figured that I’d listen to a song I enjoy. I turned out of the hardware store’s parking lot, after noting a product called traction grit in bags, a beautiful name to remember for the story writer–He sanded the sidewalk with traction grit/the rear seat rubbed (felt, cut) like traction grit against his back/traction grit had been sprinkled (tossed) over the grounds where students had been slipping their way to exams and study halls.

Anyway, I started listening to the tune and then noticed that I’d been distracted (perhaps by the name “traction grit”) and had missed most of it. I clicked back to the start, reminding myself to remember to listen. Moments later, I returned to myself and remembered that I had been disregarding the tune once again. I also noticed that I was nearing my destination–a lighting store–and hadn’t really remembered riding the road. I hadn’t noticed my passage. Nor had I been listening to the song.

There’s a metaphor here somewhere, beyond the simple idea of the meaning of time.

(By the way, before someone critiques my driving habits or considers me a danger to others, you do this too).